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A THEORY OF HEALTH INVESTMENT UNDER
COMPETING MORTALITY RISKS
Abstract
In this paper we present a theory of health investment when there are
multiple causes of death. Since there are several risks “competing“ for one's
life, the health investments in avoiding different causes of death are not
independent in general. We analyze the optimal investment rules and the
comparative statics. In particular, we search for the conditions that make
such health investments normal goods, non-Giffen goods, gross
complements to one another, and have a positive risk aversion effect. If the
proposed conditions fail, then some health investments may become net
substitutes, or even gross substitutes to one another.
JEL Classification: I11, I12.









In this paper we present a theory of health investment under competing
mortality risks. The paper is motivated by Dow, Philipson and Sala-i-Martin
( 1 9 9 9 )i nw h i c ht h e yr e j e c t e dt h ec o m m o nn o t i o nt h a ta n yc a u s e - s p e c i ¯ c
intervention is wasteful because dying from other causes is \just around the
corner." They argued that, since one dies at whichever cause that strikes
¯rst, the actual length of life is the Leontief function of cause-speci¯c lengths
of life. A cause-speci¯c intervention would be wasteful unless other causes
of death are also dealt with. Hence, there is a tendency to equalize the
occurrence of the causes, which in turns implies a spillover e®ect of a cause-
speci¯c intervention upon other cause-speci¯c interventions.
Unfortunately, the \equalizing occurrences" argument does not extend to
the case when the lifetime is uncertain even though the argument is impec-
cable in the certainty case. To see it, we consider a simple case in which the
risk of dying from each cause is exponentially distributed. In this case, the
overall life expectancy is the reciprocal of the sum of cause-speci¯c hazard
rates, not the Leontief function of cause-speci¯c life expectancies. Two more
examples, including Weibull distributions, are given in the text to stress this
point. On the other hand, we think it is plausible and intuitively appealing
that di®erent types of preventive care are complements. The question is if
and when the claim is valid. This is the objective of the paper.
A reduction in the price of a cause-speci¯c preventive care would imply
an increase in all types of preventive care if they were complements to one
another and satis¯ed the law of demand. While one is made richer by a
1lowered price, it is not necessarily true that the increased wealth can a®ord
all these additional preventive cares. If the increased wealth falls short, then
the increase in longevity derived from more health investment in all causes
is at the expense of the quality of life because the resources available for
consumption are reduced. The observation suggests that we would need a
strong quantity-of-life e®ect if the spillover e®ect were valid.
To this end, let us treat the overall life expectancy as a production func-
tion of cause-speci¯c preventive cares. One of the conditions we need is that
any two types of preventive care are complements in production. We show
that, if this complementarity dominates all other second-order e®ects put
together, then di®erent types of preventive care are net complements. Other
e®ects include the complementarity in utility between wealth and longevity,
the diminishing marginal utility of longevity, and that of wealth. Interest-
ingly enough, the same set of conditions is su±cient for all types of preventive
care to be normal goods and, therefore, gross complements to one another.
We also show that, more risk averse people, as measured by Arrow-Pratt's
relative risk aversion, will invest more in each cause-speci¯c prevention under
the same set of conditions.
On the other hand, if the proposed \strong complementarity" were not
true for certain types of preventive care, then some cause-speci¯c preventive
care may not be a normal good and the corresponding substitution matrix
may have some non-negative entries. In other words, some of them may be
net substitutes to one another, which makes gross substitutability among
them a possibility.
As for the optimal investment rules, we show that the marginal rate of
2technical substitution (of prolonging life) between any two types of preventive
care must equal their relative price. As an illustration, if each cause-speci¯c
risk has a Weibull distribution and if the hazard rate is inversely propor-
tional to the amount of preventive care, then the overall life expectancy
is a CES production function of cause-speci¯c preventions. In the special
case of exponential distributions, resources are so allocated that the medical
expenditure-hazard rate ratio is constant across all causes. It is interesting
to note that if the \equilibrium" marginal valuation of life were exogenously
given, then the optimal health investment under competing risks also maxi-
mizes the net value of life.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the model. In
section 3, we employ the standard results from the literature of competing
risks to refute the argument of equalizing occurrences. In section 4, we
present our theory implications. In section 5, we draw some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Let ¿i, i =1 ;2;:::;n; be the random variable representing the age of death
due to cause i if cause i is the only risk present. The hazard rates associated
with these random variables are known as the net hazard rates. Since one
dies only once, the actual length of life is the random variable
¿ =m i nf¿1;¿2;:::;¿ng: (1)
To make the model tractable, we assume that both the market interest rate
and the subjective discount rate are zero and that the period utility function
3is stable over time, i.e., ut (c)=u(c)f o ra l lt ¸ 0: Furthermore, we assume
that u(c) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c,s a t i s f y i n gu(0) ¸ 0
and u
0
(0) = limx!0 u
0
(x)=1. Given initial wealth W, the consumer max-
imizes the expected lifetime utility, E0
R ¿





c(t)dt = W: (2)
Let F (t) be the distribution function of ¿ with density f (t); i.e., F (t)
represents the probability of dying before or at age t. Then the survival
function is
S (t)=P r( ¿>t )=P rf¿1 >t ;¿ 2 >t;:::;¿n >t g =1¡ F (t);






tf (t)dt = ¿:








c(t)S (t)dt = W: (3)
It is obvious that the optimal consumption is c(t)=W=¿;and the indirect







1We assume that the life-span lies in the interval [0;1) instead of [0;T¤]f o rs o m e
maximal life-span T¤: The analysis and the results remain unchanged. We choose 1 so
that statistical distributions such as exponential and Weibull distributions can be directly
applied. Furthermore, as pointed out in Chang (1991), S (t) acts like a discount factor in
(3) and the budget equation (2) presumes the annuity market is perfect in the sense that
the expected (present) value of lifetime consumption is equal to the initial wealth























































i.e., there is a diminishing marginal utility of longevity.
Now suppose the random age of death due to cause i, ¿i, can be changed
through investment xi.D e n o t e i t b y ¿i (xi); which satis¯es ¿
0
i (xi) > 0i n
the sense that ¿i is increased for any realization. In so doing, we endogenize
the hazard rates and hence we may consider this health investment a form
of self-protection of Erhlich and Becker (1973). Following Kenkel (1994), we
call this type of activities that change the probability of survival preventive
medical care. It is to be distinguished from the type of health investment
that changes health stocks but not survival probabilities. See, for example,
Chang (1996).
Under uncertain lifetimes, the actual length of life with preventive care
(x1;x 2;:::;xn) is de¯ned by
¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n)=m i nf¿1 (x1);¿2 (x2);:::;¿n (xn)g:
Again, ¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n) is a random variable. Let
¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n)=E [¿ (x1;x 2;:::;xn)]
5be the overall life expectancy. We can regard ¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n) as a production
function with input vector (x1;x 2;:::;x n) because an increase in xi delays the
cause-speci¯c age of death ¿i (xi) for any realization, which in turns raises





Given investment (x1;x 2;:::;x n), the consumer's wealth is reduced to W ¡
Pn








pixi;¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n)
!
: (5)
The model is germane to the stochastic model of Dow et al (1999). However,
we disagree with their claim that, because of its similarity to the certainty
case, \the forces towards the equalization of cause-speci¯c lifetimes operate
in the more general case as well." (p.1361.)
To ensure the solution to Problem (5) uniquely exists, we assume that
the objective function V (W ¡
Pn
i=1 pixi;¿ (x1;:::;x n)) is strictly concave in
(x1;:::;x n). In particular, the Hessian matrix, H =[ hij]n£n ; is negative
de¯nite, where
hij = VWWpipj ¡ VW¿ (pi¿j + pj¿i)+V¿¿¿i¿j + V¿¿ij: (6)
To ensure xi > 0f o ra l li, we further assume ¿i (x1;:::;xn)=1 if xi =0 .
Since u
0 (0) = 1,w eh a v eVW (0;¢)=1. Hence, W ¡
Pn
i=1 pixi > 0; i.e.,
the consumer will not spend all her resources on preventive cares. Then the
unique solution to problem (5) is interior.
63C o m p e t i n g R i s k s
In this section we shall brie°y review the theory of competing risks relevant to
our problem. The theory is traced back to Daniel Bernoulli who looked into
the e®ect of population mortality if smallpox were eradicated. See, for exam-
ple, David and Moeschberger (1978, Appendix A) and Elandt-Johnson and
Johnson (1980, p. 309). Let hi (t)dt be the probability of dying from cause
i in time interval (t;t + dt); in the presence of all risks, conditional on alive
at time t: We assume the probability of more than one failure in (t;t+ dt)i s
of order (dt)
2 : This hi (t) is known as the (instantaneous) crude hazard rate.





It shows that the force of mortality is the sum of components.
It is standard in the competing risks literature to assume that all causes
of mortality are independent.2 See, for example, David and Moeschberger
(1978, section 4.4) and Elandt-Johnson and Johnson (1980, chs. 9 and 15).
If all risks are mutually independent, then hi (t) is also the net hazard rate.
In this case, crude hazard rates and net hazard rates are interchangeable.
Then, the survival function for cause i is Si (t)=e x p f¡hi (t)g; and the
o v e r a l ls u r v i v a lf u n c t i o ni sS (t)=e x pf¡
Pn
i=1hi (t)g.
To illustrate, we ¯rst assume that each cause-speci¯c survival function is
2The heuristic argument goes as follows. Assume that one may die from disease 1,
disease 2, or disease 1 and 2 simultaneously. Let ¸i be the hazard rate of disease i;i =1 ;2;
and ¸12 be the hazard rate of disease 1 and 2 simultaneously. The intuition is this: We can
treat dying from disease 1 and 2 simultaneously as if it were another disease independent of
the other two. In other words, we are dealing with three independent risks. By induction,
the argument applies to the case of multiple causes with dependency.
7exponential with parameter ¸i > 0,
Si (t)=e x pf¡¸itg;¸ i > 0;t>0:
Then the overall survival function of ¿ =m i nf¿1;:::;¿ng is also exponential,








See, for example, David and Moeschberger (1978, p.16) or Elandt-Johnson





( N o t et h a tw er e s e r v et h en o t a t i o n¿i for @¿=@xi.) Then, the overall life
expectancy in the presence of competing causes of death is





Next, we assume each cause-speci¯c risk has a Weibull distribution, i.e.,
the survival function is
Si (t)=e x pf¡(¸it)
½g;¸ i > 0;t>0;½>0:
Obviously, a Weibull distribution is reduced to an exponential distribution
when ½ = 1. Then the overall survival function of ¿ =m i nf¿1;:::;¿ng is also
of Weibull form,











A direct computation shows that
















is the gamma function.
Third, assume each cause-speci¯c hazard rate is quadratic in time, i.e.,
hi (t)=¸it+®it2. Obviously, when ®i =0 ; for all i,w eh a v et h ee x p o n e n t i a l
model. Then the overall survival function of ¿ =m i n f¿1;:::;¿ng is also
quadratic in time











A direct computation shows that, if ®>0,



























is the standard normal function.
These examples present a challenge to Dow et al's \equalizing occur-
rences" argument. Their intuition is built upon the certainty case of (1);
T =m i nfT1;T 2;:::;T ng;
where Ti is the age of death due to cause i;i =1 ;2;:::;n:Since one dies only
once, this Leontief function implies that a typical consumer will allocate
resources so as to equalize the occurrence of causes. While the stochastic
length of life takes the form of a Leontief function as shown in (1), the
overall life expectancy as shown in (7), (8) and (9), do not.
9More can be said about the overall life expectancy when each cause of
death is exponentially distributed. First, equalizing the life expectancies
of all causes of death is not a necessary condition to achieving a given life
expectancy. This can be seen from
E [¿] < minfE [¿1];E[¿2];:::;E[¿n]g;
using (7): In fact, the Leontief function of cause-speci¯c life expectancies
overestimates the true life expectancy under competing risks.
Second, the e®ect of a cause-speci¯c intervention on life expectancy, and
hence on lifetime utility, depends on the number of causes and the \weight"
of a given cause relative to all causes, ¸i=
Pn
i=1 ¸i. Speci¯cally, the elasticity










An immediate corollary is that, for a given rate of hazard reduction, the cause
with a larger share has a greater e®ect of intervention. In other words, among
all causes of death, an intervention on the deadliest cause has the greatest
impact on survival. When the number of causes, n; is large, the elasticity
tends to be small, other things being equal. The theory thus predicts that,
in the absence of an abnormally large hazard rate, the e®ect of cause-speci¯c




The ¯rst-order conditions of (5) are
¡VWpi + V¿¿i =0 ;i=1 ;2;:::;n: (11)
This is the \marginal bene¯t equals marginal cost" equation that shows the
trade-o® between the quantity and quality of life. Speci¯cally, an additional
unit of preventive care, xi, increases the life expectancy by ¿i; and hence
increases the utility by V¿¿i units. This is the marginal bene¯t of preventive
care derived from increased quantity of life. In contrast, an additional units
of xi costs pi dollars, which in turns loses VWpi units of utility. This is the
marginal cost of preventive care derived from decreased quality of life.




¿i = pi;i=1 ;2;:::;n: (12)
It follows that
¿i (x1;x 2;:::;x n)





Since ¿ (x1;:::;x n) is a production function with input vector (x1;:::;x n),
equation (13) is the familiar formula that the marginal rate of technical
substitution equals the relative price. It shows that ¿ (x1;:::;xn) is, in general,
not a Leontief function of di®erent types of preventive care. For example,
if each cause-speci¯c risk has a Weibull distribution and if the hazard rate
is inversely proportional to its investment, i.e., ¸i (xi)=ai=xi for some ai,
then, from (8),











11is a CES production function with the elasticity of substitution 1=(1 + ½) ·









i.e., the cause-speci¯c medical expenditure is positively related to its hazard
rate in equilibrium. In particular, when ½ =1 ; (when the distribution is
reduced to exponential), resources are so allocated that the ratio of medical
expenditure, pixi; to hazard rate, ¸i (xi); is constant across all causes.





By de¯nition, µ is the marginal rate of substitution between longevity (the
quantity of life) ¿ and the quality of life W. It measures the willingness
to pay for an additional year of statistical life and hence is the marginal
valuation of life. See Rosen (1994) for a discussion on this subject. Then the
left-hand-side of (12) is the value of marginal product of preventive care, and




¤ = µ (x¤
1;:::;x ¤
n)i sthe marginal valuation of life. In fact, (12)











In other words, given the equilibrium marginal valuation of life, optimal
health investment under mortality risks also maximizes the net value of life.
124.2 Wealth E®ect


























As shown earlier, VWW < 0a n dVW¿ > 0. It follows that VWWpi¡V¿W¿i < 0.
Proposition 1 All x0
is are normal goods if hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j.
The proposition follows directly from a well-known theorem in the liter-
ature of dominant diagonal matrices. Speci¯cally, if hij ¸ 0, then a negative
de¯nite matrix has an inverse matrix with only negative entries. See, for
example, Takayama (1985, Theorem 4.D.3). Since all entries in [hij]
¡1 are
negative, we have @xi=@W > 0;8i. In other words, if di®erent types of
preventive care are complements in utility, then they are normal goods.3
This mathematical result on the inverse matrix will become useful later.






Hence, for all i and j, Cji and det[hij] are opposite in sign.
Notice that every term in (6), except V¿¿ij, is negative. A necessary
condition for hij ¸ 0i st h a t¿ij > 0, i.e., inputs xi and xj are complements in
3It should be mentioned that comparative statics results can also be obtained us-
ing supermodularity approach. See, Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.8.2). Monotone compar-
ative statics (@xi=@W ¸ 0;8i) holds if the objective function of (5) is supermodular in
(x1;x 2;:::;x n;W), which translates into hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j; and ¡VWWpi + V¿W¿i ¸ 0;;8i.
13production. For example, if each cause-speci¯c risk has a Weibull distribution
and if the hazard rate is inversely proportional to its investment, then, from
(14), we have ¿i > 0a n d¿ij > 0. A su±cient condition for hij ¸ 0i st h a t
the term V¿¿ij must dominate all other negative terms in hij. The strength
of this quantity-of-life e®ect and the feasibility of hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j; will be
discussed later.
4.3 Price E®ect


































where ej is the column vector with 1 in the j-th row and 0 elsewhere. Then










The ¯rst term on the right-hand-side of (16) is the substitution e®ect and
the second term is the wealth e®ect.
Proposition 2 If hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j,t h e na l lx0
is obey the law of demand
(@xi=@pi < 0;8i) and any two x0
is are gross complements (@xi=@pj < 0;8i 6= j).
The proposition is again a corollary of the theory of dominant diagonal
matrices. As mentioned before, for all i and j, Cji and det[hij] are opposite
in sign if hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j. Hence, all entries of the substitution matrix are
negative. When i = j, the substitution e®ect of (16) is negative and the law
14of demand is satis¯ed. When i 6= j, di®erent types of preventive care are net
complements. Since the set of conditions for a negative substitution e®ect is
identical to the one for a positive wealth e®ect, di®erent types of preventive
care are also gross complements.
The spillover e®ect of competing risks and the trade-o® between the quan-
tity and quality of life can now be better understood. Since ¿ij > 0i st h e
only positive term that makes hij ¸ 0, it tells us that spillovers are not
implied by the complementarity in utility between wealth and longevity nor
by the diminishing marginal utility of longevity. A surprising result is that
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth actually works against hij ¸ 0.
Instead, it is the strong complementarity among health investments that en-
sures the quantity-of-life e®ect would dominate all other e®ects and produce
the spillover e®ects.
On the other hand, some types of preventive care may be substitutes to
one another if the conditions \hij ¸ 0 for all i 6= j"f a i l .I nt h i sc a s e ,i ti s
possible that not all entries of [hij]
¡1 are negative. Assume there exist some
i and j such that Cji and det[hij] have the same sign. Then, from (16);x i
is a net substitute to xj and, from (15), the wealth e®ect is ambiguous. Even
if xi remains a normal good, it is still possible that the substitution e®ect
dominates the wealth e®ect and, consequently, xi becomes a gross substitute
to xj. In short, if the quantity-of-life e®ect as represented by ¿ij > 0i sn o t
large enough for some i and j, then the claim of a spillover e®ect could be
false.
154.4 Risk Aversion










































































Proposition 3 If hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j,t h e n@xi=@® > 0 for all i.
Again, the proposition follows immediately from the fact that [hij]
¡1 has
only negative entries. We thus conclude that more risk averse people will
invest more in preventive cares.
4.5 On Feasibility
As mentioned before, the cross e®ect on longevity, V¿¿ij,m u s tb el a r g e
enough to ensure hij ¸ 0;8i 6= j. To illustrate the strength of this e®ect,







16Any health investment that prolongs life is the health investment that reduces
the corresponding hazard rate, i.e., ¸
0
i (xi) < 0 .[ N o t et h a tw ed i dn o ta s s u m e
the special functional form ¸i (xi)=ai=xi here.] If each ¸i (xi)i st w i c e
continuously di®erentiable in xi,t h e n¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n) is twice continuously
























i (xi),ifj = i.
(18)
Clearly, ¿ij > 0i fj 6= i.S i n c e ¿ (x1;x 2;:::;x n) is treated as a production
function, we shall assume it is a concave function and, in particular, ¿ii < 0.


































































then gij > 0; since 0 < (1 ¡ ®)=(1 + ®) < 1:
17The condition j(W ¡
Pn
i=1 pixi)(¿=b)j > 1+
p
2 is quite feasible. Since
W ¡
Pn
i=1pixi > 0 represents the wealth for lifetime consumption, which
is not small. The same is true for life expectancy ¿. The absolute value of
(W ¡
Pn
i=1pixi)(¿=b) < 0 will be large if jbj is relatively small. To ensure jbj








¯ is bounded away from zero for all
i.G i v e n¿ii < 0; it is necessary that, from (18);¸
00
i (xi) > 0. That is, ¸i (xi)
is downward sloping and convex to the origin in the (xi;¸ i)-plane. Since









¯ is bounded away from zero.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that, if cause-speci¯c preventive cares are complements
in utility, then they are normal goods, gross complements to one another,
and have a positive risk aversion e®ect. We point out that, with uncertain
lifetimes, the driving force behind the spillover e®ect is the strong comple-
mentarity in production that generates life expectancy, not the argument of
equalizing the occurrence of di®erent causes of death. Without this strong
complementarity in production, we show that net or even gross substitutes
among some of them, and hence the failure of the spillover e®ect, are quite
likely. In this sense our theory extends Dow, Philipson and Sala-i-Martin's
theory and complements their empirical ¯ndings.
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